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Abstract

Both excessive and insufficient levels of expenditure decentralization reduce efficiency of
government and service provision, thereby exerting an adverse impact on national sustainable
development. The main goal of this paper is to explore this proposition theoretically and
empirically, seeking to determine the optimal level of expenditure decentralization. From a
theoretical perspective, we introduce the expenditures of central and sub-national governments
into Barro’s (1990) model and find a hump-shaped relationship between expenditure
decentralization and sustainable development as well as striking upon the optimal expenditure
decentralization on the theoretical level. To further test this finding empirically, we adopt the
NSDI (National Sustainable Development Index) to measure sustainable development and use
panel data for 52 countries covering the period 1991-2016 to validate the theorized humpshaped relationship between expenditure decentralization and sustainable development both in
the short and long run. These results remain significant even in two-stage least squares (2SLS)
estimations with the Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI) as the instrumental variable and
are robust to alternative specifications. Finally, we also utilize the Lind-Mehlum method to
determine the optimal level of expenditure decentralization and find results consistent with the
other methods.

Keywords: sustainable development; fiscal decentralization; NSDI; Lind-Mehlum method;
optimal expenditure decentralization
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1. Introduction
This paper focuses on the impact of fiscal expenditure decentralization on sustainable
development. In recent decades, the excessive consumption of natural resources, the
deterioration of the environment and the imbalance of social economic development, have
become increasingly serious problems, leading to many countries and international organizations
to put forward plans or goals for sustainable development, such as the United Nations 2030
Agenda. And while the literature on fiscal decentralization has paid considerable attention to the
impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017), it has
ignored the broader and increasingly urgent issue of its impact on sustainable development.
Decentralized subnational governments may play important roles in the economic, social
and environmental dimensions of national sustainable development. Fiscal decentralization helps
give full play to local governments’ information advantages and initiative, leading to overall
increased economic efficiency. However, excessive fiscal decentralization can also lead to lost
economic efficiency and other negative effects such as intensified predatory intergovernmental
competition, distorting the composition of public expenditures with an adverse impact on
sustainable development. This means that there is likely to be an appropriate level of fiscal
decentralization that is the optimal choice for national sustainable development.
However, to the best of our knowledge, until now no one has studied the impact of fiscal
decentralization on sustainable development. As reviewed in the next section, a growing list of
economic studies have analyzed the factors impacting sustainable development and some of
them have pointed out the important effect of fiscal policy, but fiscal decentralization has been
ignored as a potential important factor.
This paper fills that vacuum in the literature by studying the hump-shaped impact of
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fiscal expenditure decentralization on sustainable development and in doing so analyzes what the
optimal level of expenditure decentralization may be. To achieve this goal, we use a panel data
set of 52 countries, including 20 developed countries and 32 developing countries, over two
periods, 2010-2016 for short-run effect estimates and 1991-2015 for long-run effect estimates,
and apply the Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI) as an instrumental variable to solve the
endogeneity problem with the two-stage least squared (2SLS) approach. We find a strong,
statistically significant non-linear (hump-shaped) relationship between expenditure
decentralization and sustainable development, implying an average optimal level of expenditure
decentralization ranging between 0.31 and 0.40, although the specific optimal expenditure
decentralization level for national sustainable development depends, of course, on the actual
conditions and development level of a country. The empirical results are robust to alternative
measurements of sustainable development and fiscal decentralization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is literature review. Section 3
develops a theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the National Sustainable Development
Index, methodology, and data. Section 5 presents the empirical results, robustness check, and
estimation of optimal expenditure decentralization. Section 6 concludes.
2. Review of the Literature
The concept of sustainable development originated from ecology, and more recently, it
has also become a main theme in economics, and environmental science and sociology (Ramos
& Caeiro, 2009; Bolcárová & KološTa, 2015). Environmentalists and ecologists study
sustainable development from the perspectives of environment pollution, biodiversity, and
ecosystem optimization, focusing on the long-term and healthy survival of human beings as well
as the sustainability of the ecosystem and regional environments (Adrián & Américo, 2002;
Ebert & Welsch, 2004; Kondyli, 2010). Economists continue to explore how economic theories
2

and methods can contribute to promote sustainable development (Ranis et al., 2000; BilbaoUbillos, 2013; Bolcárová & Kološta, 2015). Sociologists emphasize how structural systems,
including markets, policy, moral standards, science, and technology can maximize the
cohesiveness of nature and society into sustainable development (Ma et al., 2015). Although the
research perspectives on sustainable development are different in these various fields, their
essence and goals are the same: sustainable development requires the coordination of economic,
social, and environmental development with the goal to balance intra-generational welfare and
maximize the total welfare of all generations (Jin et al., 2020).
A growing body of economic studies have analyzed the potential role of a list of factors
as determinants of sustainable development. First, a number of studies have established that nonrenewable energy consumption and excessive dependence on natural resources are not conducive
to sustainable development (Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003; Koirala & Pradhan, 2019). A related
literature explores the impact of the electric power industry on sustainable development (Swain
& Karimu, 2020). Others have researched how information and communication technology, by
reducing information communication costs, helps decrease energy consumption and leads to
more sustainable development (Danish et al., 2019). Additionally, positive institutional
environments, democracy, greater social fairness, higher education, and human capital growth
have been found to be important drivers of sustainable development (Gnegne, 2009; Finnveden
et al., 2019). From a developing country perspective, several other studies have found foreign
direct investment, corruption, quality of governance, the legal system, and violent conflict to be
significant determinants of sustainable development (Reiter & Steensma, 2010).
More closely related to our goal in this paper, a number of papers have explored the
effect of several dimensions of fiscal policy on sustainable development. López and Figueroa
3

(2016) and Güney (2017) highlight the role of good governance on social, economic, and
environmental development, and ultimately on sustainable development. Barbier and Burgess
(2020) look at the role of subsidized clean energy and increased taxation on the use of fossil
energy to promote sustainable development in developing countries. None of these works,
however, look at the decentralization aspect of fiscal management.
Based purely on existing theory, fiscal decentralization may be an important factor
affecting the national sustainable development. Since Tiebout’s (1956) seminal paper, a large
number of researchers have considered the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic
development, such as Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Qian and Roland (1998), Thiessen (2003),
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007), Bodman (2011), Gemmell et al. (2013), and CanavireBacarreza et al. (2020). Another strand of the literature on fiscal decentralization has emphasized
how intergovernmental competition may distort fiscal choices toward “productive expenditures”
with direct economic benefits, such as infrastructure, rather than other areas lacking direct
economic benefits, such as environmental protection, public health, or education, further
affecting national development in various dimensions (Keen & Marchand, 1997; Qian & Roland,
1998; Kappeler et al., 2013; Sacchi & Salotti, 2014; Arze et al., 2016; Jin & Qian, 2020).
Combining the insights of these branches of literature, it may be theorized that
decentralization could have an inverted U-shaped impact on national sustainable development,
and that selecting an appropriate degree of decentralization is important to successful
sustainability efforts. The essence of the concept of sustainable development is that we should
pursue social and economic development to ensure the welfare of present generations, while
protecting the ecological environment and rationally utilizing natural resources to ensure the
welfare of future generations. If we were to focus only on protecting the environment, but ignore
4

economic growth, that would also not a sustainable development mode, as it would lead to
increased pressure to exploit resources for short-term survival. Neither can near-term economic
development be the only goal, as the rapid exhaustion of finite resources would leaving nothing
on which future generations could survive. Much like the balancing act of sustainable
development itself, so an appropriate degree of fiscal decentralization trades off the welfare of
present and future generations and facilitates achievement of national sustainable development.
3. Theoretical Framework
As discussed above, sustainable development implies the coordination of economic,
social, and environmental development to balance intra-generational welfare and the
maximization of the total welfare of generations. This concept can be expressed in economic
terms as the maximization of the total utility of generations. This paper studies the relationship
between sustainable development and fiscal expenditure decentralization by analyzing what the
optimal level of expenditure decentralization is to maximize intergenerational utility. In doing so,
we express the representative agent’s utility function by Eq. (1) (following Barro [1990] and
Zhang and Zou [2001]):
∞

𝑈𝑈 = ∫0 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐, 𝑔𝑔) 𝑒𝑒 −𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

(1)

Where c is per capita private consumption, 𝑔𝑔 is fiscal expenditure, and 𝜌𝜌 is the (positive)

time discount rate. The utility function 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐, 𝑔𝑔) is a concave function monotonically increasing in
private consumption and fiscal expenditure. Fiscal expenditure captures the supply of all public
goods and services.
To allow for multiple tiers of governments and thereby expenditure decentralization, we
further divide expenditure 𝑔𝑔 into central government expenditure n and sub-national government
expenditure l, following Wang et al. (2018). Assuming that there are I countries in this model,
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there will be I central governments, and so the central government expenditure vector n can be
obtained, as shown in Eq (2), as can the sub-national government expenditure vector l (J>I) as
given by Eq (3).
𝑛𝑛 = (𝑛𝑛1 , … , 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 , … , 𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼 )
𝑙𝑙 = (𝑙𝑙1 , … , 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 , … , 𝑙𝑙𝐽𝐽 )

(2)
(3)

𝑦𝑦 = 𝑘𝑘 𝛼𝛼 [∏𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 ]𝛽𝛽 [∏𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 ]𝛾𝛾

(4)

The production function is built according to the Cobb-Douglas approach:

where 𝑦𝑦 is per capita capital output, k is per capita capital stock, 1 > 𝛼𝛼 > 0, 1 > 𝛽𝛽 > 0, 1 >
𝛾𝛾 > 0, and 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾 = 1. The expenditure budgets of central government and sub-national
government are given by Eq (5) and Eq (6):

∑𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 𝑔𝑔
∑𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 = 𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔

(5)
(6)

Let 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 + 𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 = 1, 0 < 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 < 1, 0 < 𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 < 1, where 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 indicates the share of central

government expenditure in general government expenditure and 𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 indicates the share of sub-

national government expenditure in general government expenditure. We further assume that the
central government spends a share of 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼𝐼) on its 𝑖𝑖th item 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 , and that the sub-national

government spends a share of 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽) on its 𝑗𝑗th item 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 , as shown in Eq (7) and Eq (8):
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 𝑔𝑔, ∑𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 = 1
𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 = 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔, ∑𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 = 1

(7)
(8)

Under the assumption of fiscal equilibrium, the share of revenue in GDP (𝜏𝜏) is equal to the share
of expenditure (𝑔𝑔) in GDP, that is, 𝜏𝜏 = 𝑔𝑔/𝑦𝑦. At the same time, substituting 𝑛𝑛 and 𝑙𝑙 into the utility
function Eq (1), we obtain the following:

∞

𝑈𝑈 = ∫0 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐, 𝑛𝑛, 𝑙𝑙) 𝑒𝑒 −𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

(9)

Thus, we can now get the dynamic budget constraint for utility (𝑈𝑈) maximization, as in Eq (10):
6

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

= (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑦𝑦 − 𝑐𝑐 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)[∏𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ]𝛽𝛽 [∏𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 ]𝛾𝛾 − 𝑐𝑐

(10)

For convenience, let the utility function be:

𝐽𝐽

𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐, 𝑛𝑛, 𝑙𝑙) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐 + 𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ∏𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ∏𝑗𝑗=1 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗

(11)

where σ𝑛𝑛 and σ𝑙𝑙 are positive. When the output rate of fiscal expenditures (𝑛𝑛 and 𝑙𝑙) are measured

by β and γ respectively, then their impact on the agent’s utility can be measured by σ𝑛𝑛 and σ𝑙𝑙 .
𝑔𝑔

Assuming that 𝜏𝜏 is exogenous and fixed (as well as the 𝑦𝑦 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟), we obtain the following:
𝑦𝑦
𝑘𝑘

=

𝑔𝑔

𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏

= 𝜏𝜏

1−𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼

𝛽𝛽

𝛾𝛾

𝛽𝛽

[∏𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ]𝛼𝛼 [∏𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 ]𝛼𝛼 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 𝛼𝛼

∑𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖

𝛾𝛾

𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 𝛼𝛼

∑𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗

(12)

Therefore, when the total intergenerational utility is maximized, and the sustainable development
mode and the balanced growth path are achieved, the growth rate of per capita capital is:
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑/𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑦𝑦

or:
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑/𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑦𝑦

= 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜏𝜏

1−𝛼𝛼

= 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜏𝜏

1−𝛼𝛼

𝛼𝛼

𝑦𝑦

= 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜏𝜏) − 𝜌𝜌
𝑘𝑘

𝛽𝛽

(13)
𝛾𝛾

since ∑𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 1 and ∑𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 = 1, Eq (14) can be simplified as Eq (15):
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑/𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑦𝑦

𝛼𝛼

𝛽𝛽

[∏𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ]𝛼𝛼 [∏𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 ]𝛼𝛼 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽

𝛾𝛾

𝛽𝛽

∑𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖

𝛾𝛾

𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 𝛼𝛼

∑𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗

− 𝜌𝜌

𝛾𝛾

[∏𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ]𝛼𝛼 [∏𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 ]𝛼𝛼 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 𝛼𝛼 𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 𝛼𝛼 − 𝜌𝜌

(14)
(15)

According to Eq (14) and Eq (15), the maximization of total intergenerational utility is
closely related to fiscal revenue and expenditure decentralization, which implies that expenditure
decentralization is a determinant of sustainable development. Therefore, when the total
intergenerational utility is maximized, the optimal expenditure ratios of the central and subnational governments can be rendered as:
𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 ∗ =
∗

𝛽𝛽

𝛾𝛾

𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 =

𝛽𝛽

(16)

𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾
𝛾𝛾

(17)

𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾

where, therefore, 𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾 and 𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾 are the optimal expenditure ratios of the central government and
𝛾𝛾

sub-national government, respectively. This means that we can take 𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾 as the optimal
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𝛾𝛾

expenditure decentralization: when the share of sub-national expenditure exceeds 𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾, reducing

the share of sub-national expenditure is conducive to increased sustainable development; when
𝛾𝛾

the share of sub-national expenditure is lower than 𝛽𝛽+𝛾𝛾, increasing it is conducive to increased
sustainable development. So, we can state the following hypothesis:

H: there is a hump-shaped relationship between expenditure decentralization and
sustainable development.
In fact, it is quite intuitive to understand this hump-shaped relationship; if the degree of
expenditure decentralization is too high or too low, it will lead to a reduction of efficiency and
therefore to the loss of utility (Janeba & Wilson, 2011). To illustrate this point, we can take two
extreme cases: absolute fiscal expenditure decentralization or complete centralization, as
follows:
The absolute expenditure decentralization case, that is, where local governments bear all
fiscal expenditures and responsibilities, will lead to three types of issues. First, it will
reduce the scale economies effect of some public goods’ supply (Oates, 1972; Rodden,
2003), such as national defense, legislation, diplomacy, etc. Second, it will intensify some
issues about cross-regional public goods’ supply. For example, local governments will
bicker about and free-ride on cross-regional pollution prevention without the coordination
and control of the central government. More generally, it will reduce the supply
efficiency of some public goods (Keen & Marchand, 1997; Zhang & Zou, 1998). Third, it
will aggravate the imbalance and inequality of public goods’ supply among regions. For
regions with developed economies and abundant resource endowments, public goods’
supply will be guaranteed in quality and quantity, likely accelerating the further
development of these areas. Meanwhile, disadvantaged areas lacking those positive
conditions will have less access to public goods and develop relatively more slowly. This
will lead to a vicious cycle and to the continuous expansion of regional fiscal and
economic imbalance and inequity (Qian et al., 1996; Ferrario & Zanardi, 2011).
In the absolute centralization case, the central government bears all fiscal expenditures
and responsibilities, which in turn will also lead to three types of issues. First, it will
dampen local governments’ initiative. For example, in the early days of modern China,
the central government took charge of almost everything, leading to the low participation
of local agents and the low efficiency of (local) public goods’ supply (Qian & Xu, 1993).
Second, local governments’ information advantage will be wasted, again leading to the
reduced efficiency of public goods supply (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1999). Third, it will
8

make it difficult to guarantee the adaptation of public goods’ supply to regional
differences, since the central government may provide public goods uniformly to all
regions, thus reducing the welfare and utility of residents. This is especially the case for
geographically diverse and/or multi-ethnic countries, in which residents from different
biomes or ethnic groups have different customs, needs, and preferences, so they need
personalized and differentiated public goods.
In short, excessive expenditure decentralization is not conducive to adequate macro-economic
control effect and taking advantage of scale economies, while insufficient expenditure
decentralization is not conducive to giving full play to the initiative and information advantages
of local governments. Both situations lead to the decrease of efficiency and the loss of residents’
welfare (Janeba & Wilson, 2011; Oates, 1972; Chen et al., 2002; Thiessen, 2003).
4. Methodology and Data
4.1 The National Sustainable Development Index
This paper measures sustainable development by using the National Sustainable
Development Index (NSDI) previously constructed by Jin et al. (2020). However, because of the
availability of new data, we make several minor modifications and refinements based on their
work. Specifically, we introduce “population using at least basic drinking water sources (%)”,
“population using at least basic sanitary facilities (%)” and “expected years of schooling” for
indicating drinking water, sanitation facilities, and education, respectively. The upgraded NSDI,
including 3 dimensions and 12 factors, as shown in columns 1 to 3 in Table 1.
(1) Economic Dimension of the NSDI
The expectation is that governments should pursue the goals of relatively high and fair
income for residents, together with a good potential for economic growth and a reasonable
economic structure to improve the welfare of the present generation. Accordingly, indicators for
income level, economic growth, and economic structure need to be set. On the one hand, the
income level indicates the current level of economic development. Of course, this current level
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will affect further development in the future. On the other hand, economic growth and economic
structure represent the potential for future economic development. These two indicators reflect
the competitiveness of the country’s economic activities (Kondyli, 2010). This competitiveness
shapes an economic base that is supported by dynamic local activities.
Table 1. The Sustainable Development Evaluation Index
Index

Dimension
Economic
dimension
(Eco_NSDI)

National
Sustainable
Development
Index
(NSDI)

Resource and
environmental
dimension
(RE_NSDI)

Social
Dimension
(Social_NSDI)

Factor
Economic
growth
Income level
Economic
structure
Climate
Air quality
Forest
Arable land
Energy
Education
Health
Drinking
water
Sanitation
facilities

Indicator

Premise

Real GDP growth

+

Income index
Employment in services (% of total
employment)
CO2 emissions per capita
PM2.5
Forest area (% of total land area)
Arable land per person
Renewable energy consumption (%
of total final energy consumption)
Expected years of schooling
Life expectancy index
Population using at least basic
drinking-water sources (%)
Population using at least basic
sanitation facilities (%)

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

Note: The descriptions and data source of the 12 indicators can be found in Appendix Table A1.
(2) Resource and Environmental Dimension of the NSDI
The utilization of resources and the protection of the environment, through the services
they provide to society and the economy, have effects on the performance of economic activities
and on the psychosomatic condition of residents (Kondyli, 2010). Moreover, this dimension of
sustainability also reflects a welfare guarantee for future generations. Hence, the protection of
environment and the utilization of resources are important and associated with the preservation
of their quantitative and qualitative characteristics. The climate and air quality not only reflect
the living conditions and quality of human beings in the present generation, but also affect that of
future generations. In addition, forest acreage, arable land, and energy consumption represent
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current resources and environmental conditions, affecting the performance of current economic
activities. In all, these five factors also reflect the insurance of welfare for future generations.
(3) Social Dimension of the NSDI
The expectation is that governments should pursue the goal of social fairness providing
education and health services, as well as basic sanitation and drinking water. For the members of
poor families, education is an important channel for their future development, while health care
services are the basic guarantee for their productive life. Additionally, basic sanitation and
drinking water are the most basic requirements for human survival. Therefore, the above four
factors not only reflect on the current level of social welfare, but also represent the consideration
government provides for social fairness and harmony.
Jin et al. (2020) calculate the weights of 12 indicators on the basis of the Entropy method
from basic information theory, which is generally used to calculate the weight of indicators in a
composite index. Specifically, information is a measure of the degree of order in a system and
entropy is a measure of the degree of disorder in a system; therefore, the smaller the indicator’s
entropy, the greater the information provided by the indicator, the greater the effect in the
comprehensive evaluation, and the higher the weight (Wang et al., 2019). According to Ma et al.
(2015), the weight calculated by the Entropy method represents the relative rate of change of the
indicator in the composite indicators system, while the relative level of each indicator should be
figured by the standardized value of its data. Thus, the Entropy method is an objective weighting
method that makes weight judgments based on the size of the data information load. It can
reduce the influence of human subjectivity on the evaluation results and makes those results
more realistic (Wang et al., 2019; Jin et al., 2020).
To apply the Entropy method, first, we need to relate the different variables measured in
11

different units with a dimensionless scale from 0 to 1. As shown in Eq. (18), 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the indicator j

of country i, and 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the result of the dimensionless treatment. It should be noted that for some
indicators, like per capita CO2 emissions, higher values mean a poorer performance of
sustainable development, and therefore they need to be treated as shown in Eq. (19):
𝑋𝑋 −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋

(18)

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑋𝑋 −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋

(19)

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Second, by calculating the entropy value of each indicator, as shown in Eq. (20) and Eq. (21), the
entropy value of each indicator is given by 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 :

𝑞𝑞 = 1/ ln(𝑛𝑛)
𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 = −𝑞𝑞 ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(20)
(21)

Third, we calculate the information utility value of each indicator, ℎ𝑗𝑗 as:

(22)

Finally, the weight for indicator j, namely 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗 , is obtained as shown in Eq. (23).

(23)

ℎ𝑗𝑗 = 1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗

𝑝𝑝

𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗 = ℎ𝑗𝑗 / ∑𝑗𝑗=1 ℎ𝑗𝑗

We adopt the NSDI to measure sustainable development for three reasons. Firstly, the
NSDI includes economic, environmental, and social dimensions, which fits the connotation and
concept of sustainable development. Secondly, compared with other existing well-known
indices, like the Human Development Index (HDI), the Human Sustainable Development Index
(HSDI) (Bravo, 2014) and the Human Green Development Index (HGDI) (Li et al., 2014), the
NSDI is more complete, comprehensive, and accessible. Thirdly, the weights of indicators in
NSDI are measured by the Entropy method, which is more objective.
4.2 Empirical Framework
For estimating the impact of expenditure decentralization on sustainable development, we
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use an expanded Barro’s model (1990) that has become the standard approach in the fiscal
decentralization and economic growth literatures (e.g., Zhang & Zou, 2001; Enikolopov &
Zhuravskaya, 2007; Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2020), where our variable of interest is fiscal
decentralization accompanied by the necessary canonical list of control variables.
In our empirical analysis, we use several estimation methods. First, we study the effects
of cross-sectional variation about the fiscal expenditure decentralization and sustainable
development across countries with the Ordinary Least Square method (OLS). Second, our main
estimation method to explore the effects of over-time variation about fiscal expenditure
decentralization and sustainable development across countries is that of panel fixed effects
regressions (FE), since this method is statistically preferred. Third, we estimate the influential
effect of over-time variation with panel random effects regressions (RE). Fourth, the LSDV
(Least Square Dummy Variables) estimate method is used in any case of cross-section correlation
problems in the model. Finally, because fiscal decentralization is potentially endogenous with
sustainable development, we also use an IV approach, where our instrument for fiscal
expenditure decentralization is the Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI) first introduced by
Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2020).
The base regression model is given by:
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(24)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾2 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(25)
(26)

This paper also uses panel regressions with random effects and fixed effects to estimate the
effects of over-time variation:

where i and t indicate countries and years respectively; SD is an index of the sustainable
development, D denotes a measure of expenditure decentralization. This paper introduces the
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square of D to test the inverted U-shaped relationship between fiscal expenditure decentralization
and sustainable development. X is a set of dummy variables and control variables which will be
described in detail below. The detailed description and data source of these variables can be
found in Appendix Table A2.
4.3 Variables
(1) Dependent Variables
Our main interest lies in explaining how the National Sustainable Development Index
(NSDI) is affected by the level of fiscal decentralization after controlling for other determinants.
Additionally, we also use the Human Development Index as an alternative dependent variable for
the robustness check. The definitions of these and the other variables are shown in Table A2 in
the Appendix.
(2) Fiscal Expenditure Decentralization
Our main explanatory variable of interest is the share of subnational expenditures in total
government expenditures as the measure of fiscal expenditure decentralization. This measure is
the most widely used in the empirical literature on the effects of fiscal decentralization (e.g.,
Thiessen, 2003; Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007; Gemmell et al, 2013; Ligthart &
Oudheusden, 2017; Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2020). However, this is still an imperfect and
controversial measure, so it is necessary to state why this measure of expenditure
decentralization was chosen.
Several criticisms have been addressed to this GFS-based measure, 1 and alternative
measurements of fiscal decentralization have been suggested. The main criticism is that

GFS, which is short for the Government Finance Statistics produced by the International Monetary Fund, uses
the share of subnational expenditures (or revenues, taxes) in total government expenditures (or revenues, taxes)
as the measure of fiscal decentralization. With the wide use of this measure in empirical studies, many
researchers simply call it “GFS- based measure” for short.

1
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expenditure decentralization does not well capture the real autonomy of subnational
governments, whose actual level of expenditure decentralization the variable will tend to
overstate, since they may be restricted or controlled by the central government (Rodden 2004;
Baskaran & Feld, 2013). Therefore, considerable effort has been dedicated to measuring fiscal
decentralization in a more precise way; for example, Schneider (2003) and Hooghe et al. (2010)
construct indices of fiscal decentralization, which strive to account for the actual autonomy of
subnational governments, and these two indices have been used in a variety of empirical papers
(e.g., Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2011; Baskaran & Feld, 2013).
However, these fiscal decentralization indices are not panaceas and can also present
problems in their application for empirical study. One main issue is that the data used in these
indices are relatively difficult to obtain. Typically, we can only get the required data for a small
number of countries, most of which are developed countries. Accordingly, the indices are
commonly used for the empirical study of OECD countries or European Union countries, as is
the case in Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2011), Baskaran and Feld (2013), and Slavinskaitė
(2017). This issue of data unavailability raises the possibility of a different kind of estimation
error when the effects of fiscal decentralization in developed countries is generalized to larger
samples including developing countries. In this regard, alternative measures of fiscal
decentralization should not only consider its concept and connotation, but also the availability of
data (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017).
In addition, Ligthart and Oudheusden (2017) have argued that there is no evidence that
index measures are more effective than other measures nor that they yield more consistent
results. And, on the other hand, there is no empirical evidence that the GFS-based measure is less
effective as a proxy for the relative level of countries’ fiscal decentralization nor that it is subject
15

to systematic measurement error across countries (Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007; CanavireBacarreza et al., 2020).
To sum up, we choose the GFS-based measure of expenditure decentralization and accept
its imperfection, because it allows us to utilize larger samples that include more developing
countries, and thus helps us obtain empirical results with more general significance. Additionally,
although we focus on the effect of expenditure decentralization, which is expected to have
greater bearing on sustainable development, for robustness we will also use a variable measuring
overall degree of fiscal decentralization including both expenditure and revenue decentralization
(see Table A2).
(3) Endogeneity Problem and Instrumental Variables
Many past studies of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth have
suffered from an endogeneity problem (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017); while fiscal
decentralization may directly and indirectly affect economic growth, many governments have
embarked in decentralization reforms in the pursuit of accelerated economic growth. In order to
address this two-way causal relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth
past studies have used a verity of techniques including system-GMM and IV approaches
(Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007; Kyriacou et al., 2015; Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2016;
Ligthart & Oudheusden, 2017).
In the case of fiscal decentralization and sustainable development we can similarly expect
the presence of a two-way causal relationship. On the one hand, fiscal decentralization will affect
economic growth, environmental protection, public health, education, social welfare, and other
determinants of national sustainable development (Qiao et al., 2005; Fu, 2010; Granado et al,
2016; Jin & Qian, 2020). On the other hand, governments may seek to enhance sustainable
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development by adjusting their decentralization policies in areas such as health, education, social
welfare, and so on, leading to the endogeneity problem.
In order to solve the potential endogeneity of decentralization, we use the Geographic
Fragmentation Index (GFI) developed by Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016) as an instrumental
variable. The GFI was proved to be a good instrumental variable for empirical research on fiscal
decentralization (Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2020). It is not only strongly correlated with fiscal
decentralization, but it is also an exogenous variable to the economic system.
The GFI reflects the weighted probability that two individuals taken at random in the
country do not live in similar altitude zones, with the weight matrix calculated as the average
distance between altitudes. Thus, the index is simply calculated as:
J

where

ni
N

n

2

i
1 − ∑j=1 ∑N
i=1 �wij N �

(27)

is the share of the population by elevation and wij measures the distance between

altitude i and altitude j. This measure goes from zero, which corresponds to a case where all the
population is settled in the same altitude zone, to one which corresponds to the implausible case
where each person lives at a different altitude. In general, geographical fragmentation will
increase with the number of altitude-zones.
The data for the GFI are acquired from NASA’s Earth Observing System Data and
Information System (EOSDIS) hosted by the Center for International Earth Science Information
Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University. The data are available for years 1990, 1995, 2000
and 2010. Since there is low variation in the GFI over time, to address the missing values for
2001-2005, we assume them to be the same as for 2006-2010. In addition, because the data of
GFI are available only in those 5 periods, we also apply the lag period of expenditure
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decentralization as an alternative instrumental variable.
(4) Control Variables
First, we control for variables commonly used in the canonical specification in empirical
research analyzing economic growth issues, namely human capital, population, and openness
(Levine & Renelt, 1992). Specifically, we adopt the secondary school enrollment rate as the
measure of human capital (following Thiessen, 2003; Baskaran & Feld, 2013; Ligthart &
Oudheusden, 2017, among others); population is measured by the natural logarithm of the actual
population; and openness is measured by the proportion of total import and export trade to total
GDP (Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007; Gnegne, 2009; Ligthart & Oudheusden, 2017;
Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2020, among others). Within that canonical specification we also
include democracy, corruption, civil liberty, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization as proxies for
the institutional environment (as for example in Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya, 2007; Gnegne,
2009; Reiter & Steensma, 2010; Bodman, 2011; Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2020). Specifically,
democracy is measured by the democracy index from Polity IV Dataset; corruption is measured
by the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Indices from Transparency
International; civil liberty is from the Freedom House; and ethnic fractionalization is measured
by the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices (Roeder, 2001).
Second, even though is not regularly considered in the empirical study of the effects of
fiscal decentralization, we control for government size as measured by the revenue to GDP ratio.
Fiscal decentralization is generally constrained by the government’s financial capacity (Bodman,
2011; Kneller et al., 1999), and if fiscal decentralization leads to a lower public sector size
(because of the increased competition among levels of administration) and there is a negative
relationship between the public sector size and growth, then there will be a positive bias in the
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estimation (Gemmell et al., 2013).
Third, we control for the dependence on natural resources, measured by the share natural
resources rent in GDP, since their presence is likely to affect sustainable development (Pardi et
al., 2015). Revenues from natural resources such as fossil fuels and minerals can make up a
significant proportion of GDP, but their exploitation in the present will not only lower future
development and living standards but it is also likely to cause environmental pollution and
ecosystem damage (Koirala & Pradhan, 2019).
Last, we introduce time and region dummy variables to avoid the missing variable
problems caused by time or region differences (Ligthart & Oudheusden, 2017). The regional
dummy variables are created following the World Bank’s conventional division. 2
4.4 Data
Given the existing data information constraints, we put together a panel of 52 countries
(see Table A3 in the Appendix for the complete list), which includes 20 developed countries and
32 developing countries, mainly distributed in six regions, namely Europe & Central Asia, Latin
America & Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, North America, East Asia & Pacific, and Middle
East & North Africa. Two main considerations determined the selection of countries in the
sample: (i) ensuring data integrity of the NSDI, meaning that the selected countries must have
accurate data for 10 or more indicators; and (ii) confirming the selected countries have data for
expenditure decentralization and other control variables.
In order to explore the short-run and long-run effects of expenditure decentralization on
sustainable development, this paper uses two samples, as follows:

2

Namely, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, East Asia & Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, North
America, South Asia, and Middle East & North Africa.
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(1) Sample for Short-Run Effect (2010-2016)
This sample is a panel (time-series cross-country) dataset for 52 countries in the period of
2010-2016, which allows us to control for unobserved sources of country differences. Due to
some missing data about variables in this period for some countries, we adopt different
complementary methods, 3 but fortunately, there are not many missing data in this sample. The
summary statistics of this sample are shown in Table A4 in the Appendix.
(2) Sample for Long-Run Effect (1991-2015)
For this longer panel we average the values for five-year periods to smooth the data over
the macroeconomic cycle, and to allow us to explore the long-run effects (Canavire-Bacarreza et
al., 2020), Therefore we get a cross-country panel data covering five periods, namely 1991-1995,
1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010 and 2011-2015. As the time span of this sample is relatively
large and there are more cases of missing data, we add an interpolation method based on three
methods above; 4 however, in some cases we are not able to interpolate and thus we end up with a
slightly unbalanced panel data set. The summary statistics for this sample are reported also in
Table A4 in the Appendix.
5. Results
5.1 Measurement of the NSDI

3

Specifically, we use first the mean value interpolation method. For example, if the data of 2010 and 2012 are
available, but the data of 2011 is missing, we use the average value of 2010 and 2012 to replace the value of
2011. Second, the nearest neighbor interpolation method. This method is used to deal with missing data for the
variables that are very stable over time, like the natural logarithm of total population. Third, the clustering mean
interpolation method. The missing value is supplemented by the mean value of the region or organization to
which the country belongs.
4 If data for a variable is partially missing in a certain period (5 years), for example, there are only 3 years of
data, we take the average value of these 3 years as the data of this period. Specifically, in the period of 20062010, Turkey has only fiscal expenditure decentralization data in 2008, 2009 and 2010, thus we use the average
value of these three years as the average value of this period. Since this method is done over a long period of
time and across all countries, it does not raise any major problems. In addition, for some variables with serious
missing data issues, we do not make any supplement or modification. For example, the expenditure
decentralization data of United Arab Emirates before 2011 are all missing, and therefore we do not make any
interpolation.
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This paper measures the NSDI and its variation about 52 countries (see Appendix Figures
A1 and A2). As the Appendix Table A5 shows, the weights for the economic dimension, social
dimension, and resource-environmental dimension respectively account for 24.60%, 23.93% and
51.46%. The sum of the weights of the economic and social dimensions is almost equal to the
weights of the resource-environmental dimensions, the latter more closely representing the
concept and essence of sustainable development. These weights of three dimensions reflect the
welfare of the present and future generations is equally important.
Figure A1 shows the measuring result of NSDI covering 5 periods from 1991-2015. If the
sample countries are ranked by the average value of NSDI in these five periods, the top five
countries are Sweden (0.717), Australia (0.698), Canada (0.681), Iceland (0.660) and Norway
(0.659), and the bottom five countries are United Arab Emirates (0.445), China (0.402), Kiribati
(0.387), Mongolia (0.381) and Afghanistan (0.292). In this period, the ten countries with the
largest growth rate of NSDI are Azerbaijan (0.116), Moldova (0.114), Kiribati (0.108), Romania
(0.096), Lithuania (0.090), Latvia (0.090), Afghanistan (0.086), Armenia (0.078), Estonia
(0.077), and China (0.074). It means that the level of sustainable development in China, Kiribati,
and Afghanistan is low but has been greatly improved during this period.
Figure A2 shows the NSDI covering the recent 7 years from 2010-2016. Similarly, we
rank these countries according to the average value of NSDI in this period. The top five countries
still are Sweden (0.722), Australia (0.691), Iceland (0.671), Canada (0.661), and Norway (0.642),
but the order has changed. The bottom five countries are same as for the larger sample above,
namely United Arab Emirates (0.431), Kiribati (0.391), China (0.385), Mongolia (0.326), and
Afghanistan (0.245). In this period, the ten countries with the largest growth rate of NSDI are
Romania (0.059), China (0.054), Malta (0.052), Bosnia and Herzegovina (0.051), Kiribati
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(0.050), Latvia (0.047), Iceland (0.043), Lithuania (0.042), Spain (0.041), and Australia (0.039).
Overall, the measurement of NSDI shows distinct characteristics in economic level and
geographical distribution. First, the high NSDI countries tend to be developed countries mainly
in Europe and North America, while the countries with lower NSDI are all developing countries
mainly in Asia and Africa. Second, the NSDI is also relatively low in those rich Middle East
countries, because of their low score in the resource and environmental dimension. This result is
similar with alternative measures such as the HSDI (Bravo, 2014) and the HGDI (Li et al., 2014).

5.2 Short-Run Effect
Figure 1 gives a first impression of the relationship between expenditure decentralization
and sustainable development. As Figure 1a shows, there is a hump-shaped relationship between
expenditure decentralization and NSDI when we have not yet introduced the control variables
and expenditure decentralization square term. However, Figure 1a can only provide a conjecture
or hypothesis of a hump-shaped relationship. In Figures 1b and 1c, the x-axis respectively
represents “Expenditure Decentralization” and “Square Expenditure Decentralization.” Figures
1b and 1c show that, after bringing the expenditure decentralization square term and all the
control variables into the model, there is a positive correlation between expenditure
decentralization and NSDI, and a negative correlation between expenditure decentralization
square and NSDI. It means: (i) there is a hump-shaped relationship between expenditure
decentralization and NSDI, even after controlling for the other relevant variables; and (ii) it
further supports the conjecture or hypothesis in Figure 1a. However, the hump-shaped
relationship between expenditure decentralization and sustainable development in the short run
still needs to be tested empirically.
Figure 1. The Relationships of NSDI and Expenditure Decent. in the Short-Run Sample
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(a) Without control variable

(b) With control variables

(c) With control variables

We start with the OLS, FE, and RE estimations for empirical analysis of the short-run
sample (as Table 2 shows). While some of these estimation methods are likely biased, we still
include all of them: (1) to compare with each other and select the most suitable estimation
method for our sample, and (2) to compare the coefficients of various methods and discuss the
potential direction of bias.
The results of OLS estimation are reported in the second and third columns of Table 2.
The results of Model 1.1 show that the coefficients of expenditure decentralization and
expenditure decentralization square are 0.435 and -0.529 respectively, and both pass the
significance test at the level of 1%. Model 1.2 introduces time dummy variables and regional
dummy variables based on Model 1.1. Its results show that the coefficients of expenditure
decentralization and expenditure decentralization square are significantly positive and negative
respectively, and the absolute values of the two coefficients are smaller than those of Model 1.1.
It means that our models may miss some variables that affect national sustainable development,
and these missing variables are related to time and region. For example, since the temperature in
different latitudes is different, the consumption of fossil energy and carbon dioxide emissions are
also different, and these are factors affecting the sustainable development. Therefore, we need to
control the time and region dummies to solve the estimation bias caused by missing variables to
the extent possible. In addition, it should be noted that these empirical results need to be treated
cautiously, because OLS estimation cannot effectively control the time and individual effects.
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Model 1.3 and Model 1.4 show that the coefficients of expenditure decentralization and
expenditure decentralization square are significantly positive and negative respectively, and the
absolute values of two coefficients are obviously reduced compared with Model 1.1 and Model
1.2. This means that the time effect and individual effect will cause the estimation bias of
regression results in these models and indicates that the two-way FE estimation is preferred. In
addition, the F-test values of model 1.3 and model 1.4 are 215.25 and 391.58 respectively, which
further indicates that FE estimation is more suitable for this sample than OLS estimation. It
should be noted that the indicators used to measure ethnic fractionalization, corruption, and civil
liberties change very little over time, so they are not brought into the FE estimation. 5
Having found evidence of the need for a panel effects approach, we need to make a
choice between FE and RE models using the Hausman test. However, the Hausman test will fail
if the model has cross-section correlation problems; therefore, we have to test the cross-section
correlation first. Three cross-section correlation test methods are widely used, namely Pesaran’s
test, Friedman’s test, and Free’s test, all of which have different applicable conditions. Among
them, Free’s test is the most suitable, because the data are balanced panel data and the time effect
needs to be considered in this model. The result of Free’s test shows that the model has a crosssection correlation problem. To handle this situation, we perform an auxiliary regression
estimation and then conduct a joint significance test for the deviation of all within-subject
variables. In fact, this test can be seen as is an enhanced version of the Hausman test which could
be called the “robust Hausman test”. As the result of robust Hausman test shows, the estimation
gap between FE and RE is too large, which indicates that FE results are consistent while RE

5

These are measured by the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index,
and the level of civil liberties (see Appendix Table A2), and see Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) and Canavire-Bacarreza et
al. (2020) for further discussion.
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results are biased, so FE should be selected.
Table 2. Regression Results in the Short Run Sample (2010-2016), NSDI
(1.1)

(1.2)
(1.3)
(1.4)
(1.5)
OLS
FE
RE
Expenditure
0.435*** 0.371*** 0.221*** 0.128*** 0.096**
Decent.
(0.055)
(0.055)
(0.064)
(0.048)
(0.047)
Expenditure
-0.529*** -0.444*** -0.285*** -0.205** -0.148**
Decent.2
(0.068)
(0.071)
(0.105)
(0.079)
(0.073)
Government
-0.149*** -0.106*** 0.027**
0.003
0.002
size
(0.023)
(0.022)
(0.013)
(0.010)
(0.010)
0.080*** 0.086*** 0.024***
-0.005
-0.004
Human capital
(0.019)
(0.018)
(0.008)
(0.006)
(0.006)
-0.007*** -0.008*** -0.139*** -0.055**
0.002
Population
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.029)
(0.025)
(0.005)
-0.023*** -0.020***
-0.009
-0.012*
-0.009
Openness
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.007)
(0.007)
Dependence on -0.237*** -0.214*** -0.069**
0.034
0.039*
nat. resources
(0.044)
(0.040)
(0.028)
(0.022)
(0.022)
***
***
Ethnic
-0.036
-0.037
0.017
Fractionalizatio (0.014)
(0.014)
(0.038)
n
-0.002 -0.006***
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
Democracy
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.015*** 0.019***
0.022***
Corruption
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.006)
0.001*
0.001*
0.001
Civil Liberties
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)
0.511*** 0.509*** -1.715*** 1.454*** 0.367***
Constant
(0.049)
(0.043)
(0.465)
(0.406)
(0.093)
Time dummy
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Region dummy
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
R2
0.668
0.760
F
64.36*** 48.94*** 215.25*** 391.58***
Wald
Robust Hausman
29.19***
No. of countries
52
52
52
52
52
Observations
364
364
364
364
364

(1.6)
LSDV
0.128***
(0.026)
-0.205***
(0.057)
0.003
(0.017)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.055**
(0.015)
-0.012*
(0.006)
0.034
(0.026)
0.429***
(0.176)

(1.7)
FE2SLS
0.128***
(0.031)
-0.263***
(0.066)
-0.007
(0.011)
0.004
(0.010)
-0.038
(0.031)
-0.010
(0.008)
0.044*
(0.023)

(1.8)
EC2SLS
0.115**
(0.041)
-0.271***
(0.080)
-0.009
(0.012)
0.002
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.007)
0.051**
(0.022)
0.007
(0.031)

0.001***
(0.000)
0.151***
(0.028)
0.012**
(0.004)

-0.001**
(0.000)

1.157***
(0.253)
Yes
Yes

-0.001*
(0.001)
0.024***
(0.005)
0.001
(0.001)
0.354***
(0.048)
Yes
Yes

52
312

52
312

Yes
Yes
0.994
934.55*** 204.18***
605.62*** 447.76***
52
364

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
As mentioned above, there is a cross-section correlation problem in FE, so we use LSDV
estimation to solve this problem (see Model 1.6). The coefficients of expenditure
decentralization and expenditure decentralization square are 0.128 and -0.205 respectively,
which are consistent with the coefficients in Model 1.4, and significant at the level of 1% and
5%. These results are very stable, but still they need to be taken with caution because of the
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potential endogeneity problem.
Last, in order to address the endogeneity problem, we use FE2SLS and EC2SLS
approaches with the lag period of expenditure decentralization as an instrumental variable. The
result of FE2SLS as Model 1.7 shows, the coefficients of expenditure decentralization and
expenditure decentralization square are 0.128 and -0.263 respectively, which are close to the
results of Models 1.4 and 1.6. The EC2SLS, an error corrected IV-approach, can be used to
estimate the variable which does not change with time as an improved scheme of FE2SLS. Both
the results of FE2SLS and EC2SLS show that the effect of expenditure decentralization on
sustainable development is hump-shaped in short term.
Additionally, we can also observe the results for some control variables in Models 1.6,
1.7, and 1.8. Population growth and trade openness have a significant negative correlation with
the NSDI in the short term. There is a significant positive correlation between ethnic
fractionalization and NSDI. The rest of the control variables are statistically insignificant.
5.3 Long-Run Effect
Figure 2 shows the scatter plot and regression line in the long-run sample. Figure 2a is
the scatter plot and regression line without control variables, b and c are the scatter plots and
regression lines after regression estimation with control variables. This figure preliminarily
validates our basic hypothesis. By comparing Figure 2 and Figure 1, it can be seen that the
scatter plot in the long-run sample is much looser than that of short-run sample, which may be
because of the fewer observations and more missing values in long-run sample (see Appendix
Table A4). In addition, the slope of regression lines in Figure 2 is not steep as that in Figure 1,
which may be because the long-run sample helps to smooth the data over the macroeconomic
cycle and weakens the impact of short-run economic fluctuations.
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Figure 2. The Relationships of NSDI and Expenditure Decent. in the Long-Run Sample

(a) Without control variable

(b) With control variables

(c) With control variables

We also employ OLS, RE, and FE to estimate the long-run impact of expenditure
decentralization on sustainable development (results as Table 3 presents). Our interest is to find
the most suitable estimation method for the long-run sample, but also to be able to compare the
long-run and short-run effects of expenditure decentralization on sustainable development.
The F-test values again indicate that two-way FE estimation is better than OLS
estimation for the long-run sample. Before the further selection between FE and RE, it is
necessary to examine the cross-section correlation problems of the models. The Pesaran’s test
and Free’s test both need to be used for the cross-section correlation test, because the data used in
the models is not strongly balanced panel data. The test results confirm the presence of crosssection correlation problems, so the robust Hausman test is used to compare FE and RE. Finally,
we find that the estimation gap between FE and RE is too large, hence FE is the most suitable
choice.

Table 3. Regression Results in the Long-Run Sample (1991-2015), NSDI

Expenditure
Decent.

(2.1)
OLS
0.363***
(0.085)

(2.2)
OLS
0.319***
(0.083)

(2.3)
FE
0.192**
(0.087)

(2.4)
FE
0.106**
(0.055)

(2.5)
RE
0.085**
(0.037)

(2.6)
LSDV
0.106**
(0.043)

(2.7)
FE2SLS
0.748***
(0.190)

(2.8)
EC2SLS
0.669***
(0.194)
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-0.453***
(0.114)
-0.103**
(0.041)
0.108***
Human capital
(0.030)
-0.006
Population
(0.004)
-0.026**
Openness
(0.011)
Dependence on -0.131*
nat. resources
(0.072)
Ethnic
-0.012
Fractionalizatio (0.019)
n
-0.000
Democracy
(0.002)
0.015***
Corruption
(0.004)
-0.000
Civil Liberties
(0.001)
0.526***
Constant
(0.069)
Time dummy
No
Region dummy
No
R2
0.531
Expenditure
Decent.2
Government
size

F/Wald

17.61***

Robust Hausman
No. of countries
52
Observations
183

-0.417*** -0.251*
-0.167*
(0.113)
(0.163)
(0.101)
-0.058
0.136*** 0.132***
(0.038)
(0.040)
(0.024)
0.099*** 0.081*** 0.028***
(0.027)
(0.017)
(0.011)
-0.007** -0.061*** -0.052***
(0.003)
(0.020)
(0.014)
-0.022** 0.058*** 0.014**
(0.010)
(0.008)
(0.006)
-0.147**
0.019
-0.031
(0.060)
(0.051)
(0.032)
-0.028
(0.018)

-0.134** -0.167** -0.858***
(0.063) (0.067)
(0.239)
0.108*** 0.132*** 0.163***
(0.024) (0.019)
(0.057)
0.029*** 0.028***
0.024
(0.011) (0.008)
(0.019)
-0.003 -0.052*** -0.053**
(0.005) (0.011)
(0.025)
0.015** 0.014**
0.006
(0.006) (0.005)
(0.014)
-0.040
-0.031
0.106
(0.033) (0.023)
(0.181)
0.013
0.142***
(0.038) (0.023)

-0.968***
(0.268)
0.058**
(0.040)
0.040
(0.020)
-0.057***
(0.016)
0.004
(0.009)
0.016
(0.058)
-0.026
(0.032)

-0.003
(0.002)
0.018***
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.001)
0.509***
(0.058)
Yes
Yes
0.700

0.001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.001***
(0.000)
0.074***
(0.012)
0.011***
(0.004)

-0.617*
(0.320)
No
No

1.282***
(0.226)
Yes
Yes

0.001
(0.001)
0.020***
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.404***
(0.090)
Yes
Yes

0.001
(0.001)
0.025***
(0.006)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.446***
(0.090)
Yes
Yes

18.93***

62.60***

176.92***

52
183

52
183

35.413***
52
52
183
183

Yes
Yes
0.993
244.23***
52
183

0.001
(0.001)

1.201***
(0.408)
Yes
Yes

133.64***
302.10***
/ 336.20***
52
183

52
183

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The LSDV estimation is also used in Model 2.6 to solve the cross-section correlation
problem. The result of Model 2.6 reports that the coefficients of expenditure decentralization and
expenditure decentralization square are 0.106 and -0.167 respectively, which are significant at
the level of 5%. It should be noted that the absolute values of the coefficients of expenditure
decentralization and expenditure decentralization square in Model 2.6 are smaller than those in
Model 1.6 and the significance level is not as good as that in Model 1.6. The first reason for this
situation is the issue of missing data. There are many missing values in the long-run sample (see
Appendix Table A4), and the data are not a strongly balanced panel. Second, short-run economic
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fluctuation disturbs the estimation results, because it also affects the national sustainable
development. If a country has severe macroeconomic fluctuations in a short period, this is
obviously not conducive to national sustainable development. For example, the international
financial crisis that started in 2008 affected the macroeconomic stability of most countries in the
world, leading to many problems that restrict national sustainable development, such as the
decline of GDP, the rise of the unemployment rate, the increase of social instability factors, etc.
To solve the endogeneity problem in the long-run sample, we use FE2SLS and EC2SLS
approaches with the GFI as the instrumental variable. The results of FE2SLS and EC2SLS are as
Models 2.7 and 2.8 show, the coefficients of expenditure decentralization and expenditure
decentralization square are positive and negative respectively, and both pass the significance test
of 1%. By comparing the results of FE, LSDV, and 2SLS, we find that there is a significant
hump-shaped relationship between expenditure decentralization and sustainable development in
the long run and the empirical results are very robust, meaning that our basic hypothesis has been
well tested in long-run samples too.
Additionally, we can also observe the results for some control variables in Models 2.6,
2.7, and 2.8. Government size, human capital, and civil liberties have significant positive
correlations with NSDI in the long-run sample, but these are not significant in the short-run
sample. Population and corruption have significant negative correlations with sustainable
development in the long-run sample. Note that corruption is measured by the Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Indices, with higher values corresponding to lower levels of
corruption. The other control variables are not significant.
5.4 Robustness Checks
We conduct two robustness checks. First, we use the overall degree of fiscal
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decentralization, so as to account for both expenditure and revenue decentralization, as an
alternative independent variable. The overall degree of fiscal decentralization is measured by the
weighted average value of the share of subnational expenditure in total government expenditure
and the share of subnational revenue in total government revenue.
In the second robustness check, we adopt the HDI (Human Development Index) as an
alternative dependent variable for measuring sustainable development. The NSDI is a relatively
complete and systematic index for measuring sustainable development, but it is newer and less
tested. The HDI is reported annually as part of the Human Development Report of UNDP
(United Nations Development Programme) and has gradually been used widely as a
sustainability assessment index due to its simple composition and rich connotation (BilbaoUbillos, 2013; Li et al., 2014).
Considering the potential presence of endogeneity and the limited space to replicate the
entire analysis, we directly use EC2SLS estimation to carry out the robustness check (see Table
4). The results of the first robustness check approach are reported in Models 3.1 and 3.2 in Table
4, which confirm that the overall degree of fiscal decentralization is hump-shaped related with
NSDI both in the short term or long term. Models 3.3 and 3.4 report the results of the second
robustness check approach. These two models also show a hump-shaped relationship between
expenditure decentralization and HDI. These results not only support our theoretical analysis, but
also show that the empirical results in Tables 2 and 3 are robust.

Table 4. Robustness Checks, EC2SLS
First Robustness Check:

Second Robustness Check:
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Overall Level of FD
NSDI
Short-run
Long-run
(3.1)
(3.2)
Expenditure
Decentralization
Expenditure
Decentralization2
Fiscal
Decentralization
Fiscal
Decentralization2
Government size
Human capital
Population
Openness
Dependence on
natural resources
Ethnic
Fractionalization
Democracy
Corruption
Civil Liberties
Constant
Time dummy
Region dummy
Wald
Number of countries
Observations

0.222**
(0.104)
-0.345**
(0.144)
0.021
(0.016)
0.010
(0.010)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.008)
0.066***
(0.024)
-0.004
(0.037)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.024***
(0.006)
0.001
(0.001)
0.402***
(0.095)
YES
YES
381.40***
52
302

0.635**
(0.303)
-0.996**
(0.420)
0.020
(0.059)
0.033**
(0.016)
-0.012
(0.009)
0.010
(0.008)
0.027
(0.071)
-0.024
(0.054)
0.001
(0.001)
0.027***
(0.009)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.553***
(0.136)
YES
YES
435.34***
52
181

HDI as Dependent Variable
HDI
Short-run
Long-run
(3.3)
(3.4)
**
0.131
0.284**
(0.050)
(0.123)
-0.226**
-0.381**
(0.080)
(0.183)

0.007
(0.007)
0.033***
(0.006)
0.008**
(0.004)
0.001
(0.005)
-0.029**
(0.014)
-0.045*
(0.027)
0.001
(0.001)
0.028***
(0.004)
0.001
(0.001)
0.489***
(0.066)
YES
YES
602.30***
52
312

-0.182***
(0.027)
0.164***
(0.021)
0.008**
(0.003)
0.015*
(0.008)
0.153***
(0.045)
-0.099***
(0.014)
0.005**
(0.002)
0.025***
(0.003)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.335***
(0.054)
YES
YES
780.31***
52
183

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
5.5 Estimation of the Optimal Level of Expenditure Decentralization
This paper brings expenditure decentralization and expenditure decentralization square
into the model simultaneously, which is a common method to test a U-shaped relationship in
empirical research. However, Lind and Mehlum (2010) have questioned this method. They find
that when the real relationship between independent and dependent variables is “convex and
monotonous,” the above test method will also hold. This means that the inverted U-shaped
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relationship could not be guaranteed with this traditional empirical method, because the presence
of just a “convex and monotonous” relationship is also possible. Lind and Mehlum (2010) put
forward a new method to test a U-shaped (or inverted U-shaped) relationship by simulating the
relationship curve of two variables as well the extreme point, then verifying the correlation of the
curves on both sides of the extreme point.
The Lind-Mehlum method has two advantages over the traditional method of fitting a
quadratic form. First, it can make up for the defects of the traditional empirical method and
accurately test whether the two variables are related in a U-shaped (or inverted U-shaped)
relationship or rather just have a “convex and monotonous” relationship. Second, it can easily be
used to estimate the minimum point of the simulated U-shaped curve or the maximum point of
simulated inverted U-shaped curve; hence, it can be used to estimate the optimal level of
expenditure decentralization.
Table 5. The Estimation of the Optimal Expenditure Decentralization
Model
1.6
1.7
1.8
2.6
2.7
2.8
3.3
3.4

SD U-Shape Lower Bound Slope
NSDI
Yes
0.127***
NSDI
Yes
0.127***
NSDI
Yes
0.118**
NSDI
Yes
0.084**
NSDI
Yes
0.741***
NSDI
Yes
0.661***
HDI
Yes
0.145**
HDI
Yes
0.280**

Upper Bound Slope
-0.223***
-0.312***
-0.325***
-0.121*
-0.715***
-0.981***
-0.278**
-0.366**

Optimal point
0.311
0.309
0.315
0.319
0.335
0.345
0.381
0.395

Note: (1) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (2) SD indicates the sustainable development
metric, for which NSDI and HDI are both used in this paper.
In particular, we employ the Lind-Mehlum method to test Models 1.6-1.8, 2.6-2.8, and
3.3-3.4 for the presence of an inverted U-shaped relationship and also to estimate the optimal
degree of expenditure decentralization. The U-shaped test results in Columns 3-5 of Table 5
show that expenditure decentralization has an inverted U-shaped relationship with NSDI and
HDI and Column 6 of Table 5 presents the optimal degree of expenditure decentralization for
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each model. When sustainable development is measured by the NSDI, the optimal expenditure
decentralization levels in the short-term and long-term samples are between 0.309 and 0.345.
When sustainable development is measured by the HDI, the optimal expenditure decentralization
levels in the short-term and long-term samples are 0.381 and 0.395, respectively. Not only are
the optimal points quite similar, but the differences can be easily explained by the content of the
two indexes: while NSDI includes economic, resource, environmental, and social dimensions,
the HDI mainly considers the social-economic dimension.
Despite the quantitative precision of the estimates in Table 5, we need to be reminded that
the optimal expenditure decentralization level is not a static and absolute proposition, but rather a
dynamic one, responding to the actual conditions and the economic development of a country.
First, a country’s actual conditions must be considered to determine the optimal degree of
expenditure decentralization. In particular, country size is an important determinant of fiscal
decentralization (Panizza, 1999; Arzaghi & Henderson, 2005; Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya,
2007). The larger the country size, the farther apart the residents and administrative center will
be, and therefore the more powers need to be allocated to local governments to manage their
affairs far away from the center. In the same direction, Baskaran and Feld (2013) and Ligthart
and Oudheusden (2017) suggest that Federal countries need to allocate more power to local
governments than Unitary countries. Panizza (1999) and Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2020) also
show that the higher the degree of ethnic fractionalization, the more fiscal decentralization is
needed. Jilek (2018) points out that population and country size jointly affect fiscal
decentralization, which means that countries with higher population density need higher degrees
of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, at the least, the determination of the optimal expenditure
decentralization level needs to consider the country size, national structure, ethnic
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fractionalization, population density, and other actual conditions.
Second, the economic development level of the country must be considered to determine
the optimal degree of expenditure decentralization regarding the NSDI and HDI, as reflected in
the results in Table 5. In fact, as we have seen, the NSDI and HDI imply different development
policies and goals. The NSDI includes 12 indicators of economic, environmental, and social
dimensions, which implies comprehensive development policy and goals in all aspects. By
contrast, the HDI only includes economic and social indicators, which makes many rich
countries with high energy consumption and high emissions also be identified as high HDI
countries. In fact, this is one of the important reasons why the HDI is a controversial measure of
sustainable development. Clearly, the optimal expenditure decentralization level under the
guidance of different development policy objectives will be, and has been empirically found to
be (Table 5), different. For example, a country in the initial development stage may adopt a
development policy with economic growth as the main goal and carry out decentralization
reforms to narrowly promote economic growth, which has happened in many developing
countries.
6. Conclusion
The key finding in this paper is that fiscal expenditure decentralization has a humpshaped relationship with sustainable development, implying that there is an optimal degree of
expenditure decentralization. In this paper, we first theoretically introduce the expenditure of
central government and sub-national government into Barro’s model (1990) and derive a humpshaped relationship between expenditure and sustainable development as well as the optimal
expenditure decentralization level. Second, we empirically validate this hump-shaped
relationship both in the short and long runs in relation to the National Sustainable Development
Index, based on a panel dataset of 52 countries over the period 1991 to 2016, utilizing a variety
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of estimation approaches and the Geographic Fragmentation Index as an instrumental variable.
Our empirical results are robust to alternative specifications, namely the Human Development
Index instead of the NSDI and the use of the overall degree of fiscal decentralization rather than
just that of expenditure decentralization. Finally, we estimate the optimal level of expenditure
decentralization with the Lind-Mehlum method.
These finding have some tentative policy implications. The hump-shaped relationship
implies that excessive expenditure decentralization will weaken the macro-control ability of a
central government and the scale effect of public goods’ supply, while insufficient expenditure
decentralization will restrain the benefits from autonomy and the diverse initiatives of local
governments. These two situations both reduce the efficiency of public goods’ supply and
residents’ welfare, undermining national sustainable development. However, there is no universal
degree of optimal decentralization since policymakers must consider the development level of
the country and its actual conditions along several dimensions such as country size, population
density, ethnic diversity, and so on, when calculating that country’s optimal decentralization.
In short, policymakers need to calibrate the appropriate level of expenditure
decentralization to achieve sustainable development. For countries with insufficient expenditure
decentralization, further fiscal decentralization reform is called for. For countries with excessive
expenditure decentralization, the recentralization of government’s expenditure and
responsibilities is called for. Although examples of the former may be more common, there are
also examples of the latter. For example, in China, the share of sub-national government
expenditure is higher than 85 percent in recent years, which likely means excessive expenditure
decentralization, with marked emphasis on infrastructure spending for regional economic growth
at the cost of spending on education, environmental protection, public health, social welfare, etc.,
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thereby eroding sustainable development. As to what degree of decentralization is appropriate for
China or any other specific country, the question will need further study considering the current
development level and actual conditions of the country of interest.
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Appendix
Table A1. The Descriptions and Data Sources of the 12 Indicators in NSDI
Indicator

Description

Source
World
Bank

GDP Growth

Real GDP growth.

Income
index

According to Atkinson (1970), calculating the income index can reflect
fairness and equality, in the case of unequal distribution factors, based
on the disposable income or consumption of per capita family. The
higher the income index is, the better the economic situation of the
country is, and the more equal and fairer the income distribution of
country is.

UNDP

Employment
in services
(% of total
employment)

The proportion of employments of the tertiary industry in total
employments which is used to measure the economic structure.

UNDP

Per capita
CO2
emissions

It refers to the CO2 emission generated by the combustion of energy
such as coal, oil, natural gas and so on (Unit: ton per person).

PM2.5

It represents the concentration of fine suspended particles with a
diameter less than 2.5 microns in the atmosphere, which can penetrate
the respiratory tract and cause serious health damage (Unit: microgram
/ m3).

World
Bank

Forest
coverage rate

The forest coverage rate is the proportion of forest area in the total land
area. While the forest area refers to the land covered by upright trees (at
least 5m) which grow naturally or are planted artificially.

UNDP

Arable land
per person

Arable land includes temporary crop land (double cropping rice field is
calculated once), temporary grassland for mowing or pasture, market or
kitchen garden land and temporary fallow land, but excludes the land
abandoned due to rotation.

World
Bank

Renewable
energy
consumption

It refers to the proportion of renewable energy consumption in total
energy consumption. The higher the proportion is, the more conducive
to the sustainable development in resources and environmental
dimension.

UNDP

Expected
years of
schooling

Expected year of education (unit: years). Number of years of schooling
that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing
patterns of age-specific enrolment rates persist throughout the child’s
life.

UNDP

Life
expectancy
index

According to Atkinson (1970), calculating the life expectancy index can
reflect fairness and equality, in the case of unequal distribution factors,
based on the data of UN life table. The higher the index value, the better
the health status of residents, the more equal and fairer the access to
health for residents.

UNDP

Population
using at least
basic
drinkingwater

The population that drinks water from an improved source, provided
collection time is not more than 30 minutes for a round trip. This
indicator encompasses people using basic drinking-water services as
well as those using safely managed drinking-water services. Improved
water sources include piped water, boreholes or tube wells, protected

WHO

IEA
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sources (%)

dug wells, protected springs, and packaged or delivered water.

Population
using at least
basic
sanitation
facilities (%)

Percentage of the population using at least basic sanitation services, that
is, improved sanitation facilities that are not shared with other
households. This indicator encompasses people using basic sanitation
services as well as those using safely managed sanitation services.
Improved sanitation facilities include flush/pour flush toilets connected
to piped sewer systems, septic tanks or pit latrines; pit latrines with
slabs (including ventilated pit latrines); and composting toilets.

WHO

Note: the UNDP, IEA, and WHO are short for the United Nations Development Program, the
International Energy Agency, and the World Health Organization, respectively.

Table A2. Description and Sources of Variables used in Regressions
Variable
NSDI

Description
The National Sustainable Development Index constructed by
Jin et al. (2020). Its value ranges from 0 to 1, with higher
values corresponding to better performance in national
comprehensive sustainable development.

Source
See Table A1

Eco_NSDI

The sub-index of NSDI in economic dimension.

See Table A1

RE_NSDI

The sub-index of NSDI in resource and environmental
dimension.

See Table A1

Social_NSDI

The sub-index of NSDI in social dimension.

See Table A1

HDI

The Human Development Index. Its value ranges from 0 to 1,
with higher values corresponding to better performance in
national human development.

Expenditure
decentralization

Share of subnational expenditure in total government
expenditure (%).

IMF-GFS

Fiscal
decentralization

The overall degree of fiscal decentralization in expenditure
and revenue. The average value of the share of subnational
expenditure in total government expenditure and the share of
subnational revenue in total government revenue.

IMF-GFS

Geographic
Fragmentation
Index (GFI)

The GFI reflects the weighted probability that two individuals
taken at random in the country do not live in similar altitude
zones, with the weight matrix calculated as the average
distance between altitudes.

CanavireBacarreza et
al. (2016)

Government size

Share of fiscal revenue in GDP (%).

Human capital

Secondary school enrollment (% gross).

World Bank

Population

Natural logarithm of actual population.

World Bank

Openness

The share of export and import in GDP (%).

Dependence on
natural resources

The share of total natural resources rents in GDP (%). Total
natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas
rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest
rents. The higher the value, the more dependent the country
is on natural resources.

Ethnic

The Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Indices for the year

UNDP

IMF-GFS

UNCTAD

World Bank

Roeder
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Fractionalization

1985. Its value ranges from 0 to 1.

(2001)

Democracy

Current level of democracy. Scale from 0 to 10, with higher
values corresponding to higher democratic level.

Corruption

The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions
Indices for year 2008. Its value ranges from 0 to 10, with
higher values corresponding to lower level of corruption.

Civil liberties

The level of civil liberties. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms
of expression and belief, associational and organizational
rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without
interference from the state. Its value ranges from 0 to 6, with
higher values corresponding to higher level of civil liberties.

Time dummy

In the sample of short-run effect, time dummies are created
by the years from 2010 to 2016. In the sample of long-run
effect, time dummies are created by 5 periods, namely 19911995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2015.

—

Region dummy

Scale from 1 to 6, respectively represents Europe & Central
Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, North
America, East Asia & Pacific, Middle East & North Africa.

World Bank

Polity IV
Dataset
Transparency
International

Freedom
House

Note: (1) the UNCTAD is short for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
(2) The Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Indices could be found:
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm. (3) The Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Indices could be found: http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/.

Table A3. Sample of Countries by Development Level and Region
Country

DC

Country

Region

DC

N

South Korea

East Asia & Pacific

Y

Albania
Armenia

Region
Middle East & North
Africa
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia

N
N

Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia

N
N

Australia

East Asia & Pacific

Y

Europe & Central Asia

N

Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia

Y
N
N
Y

Latvia
Lithuania
North
Macedonia
Malta
Mauritius
Moldova
Mongolia

Europe & Central Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Europe & Central Asia
East Asia & Pacific

Y
N
N
N

Europe & Central Asia

N

Myanmar

East Asia & Pacific

N

N

Netherlands

Europe & Central Asia

Y

Y

New Zealand

East Asia & Pacific

Y

N

Norway

Europe & Central Asia

Y

Afghanistan

Brazil
Canada
Chile

Latin America &
Caribbean
North America
Latin America &
Caribbean

China

East Asia & Pacific

N

Paraguay

Colombia

Latin America &

N

Peru

Latin America &
Caribbean
Latin America &

N
N
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Costa Rica
El Salvador
Estonia
Georgia
Germany
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
Israel

Caribbean
Latin America &
Caribbean
Latin America &
Caribbean
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America &
Caribbean
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Middle East & North
Africa

Caribbean
N

Romania

Europe & Central Asia

N

Europe & Central Asia

N

Sub-Saharan Africa
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia

N
Y
Y

Y
N
Y

Russian
Federation
South Africa
Spain
Sweden

N

Switzerland

Europe & Central Asia

Y

Y
Y

Thailand
Turkey

East Asia & Pacific
Europe & Central Asia

N
N

Y

Ukraine

Europe & Central Asia

N

United Arab
Emirates
United
Kingdom
United States

Middle East & North
Africa

N

Europe & Central Asia

Y

North America

Y

N

Japan

East Asia & Pacific

Y

Kazakhstan

Europe & Central Asia

N

Kiribati

East Asia & Pacific

N

Note: DC indicates whether it is a developed country, according to the standards of CIA’s the
World Fact Book and IMF, where Y is short for yes and N is short for no.

Table A4. Summary Statistics
Sample of Short-Run Effect
(2010-2016)
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
NSDI
364
0.54
0.09
Eco_NSDI
364
0.15
0.04
RE_NSDI
364
0.23
0.05
Social_NSDI
364
0.16
0.03
HDI
364
0.80
0.11
Expenditure decent.
364
0.28
0.19
Fiscal decentralization
354
0.23
0.18
Geographic Fragmentation Index
Government size
364
0.36
0.14
Human capital
364
1.00
0.20
Population
364
16.31
1.76
Openness
364
0.90
0.48
Depend. on nat. resources
364
0.04
0.07
Ethnic fractionalization
364
0.37
0.22
Democracy
364
7.38
3.48
Corruption
364
5.18
2.39
Civil liberties
364
4.19
1.57
Variables

Sample of Long-Run Effect
(1991-2015)
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
260
0.55
0.09
260
0.15
0.04
260
0.23
0.05
260
0.17
0.04
260
0.75
0.12
190
0.30
0.18
185
0.24
0.16
260
0.35
0.08
200
0.35
0.11
253
0.91
0.24
260
16.24
1.76
258
0.84
0.43
258
0.04
0.06
260
0.37
0.22
260
7.19
3.43
260
5.18
2.39
260
4.19
1.57
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Table A5. The Weights of 12 Indicators in NSDI
Index

Dimension
Economic
dimension
(Eco_NSDI)

National
Sustainable
Development
Index (NSDI)

Resource and
environmental
dimension
(RE_NSDI)

Social
Dimension
(Social_NSDI)

Factor
Economic growth
Income level
Economic
structure
Climate
Air quality
Forest
Arable land
Energy
Education
Health
Drinking-water
Sanitation

Indicator
Real GDP growth
Income index
Employment in services (% of total
employment)
CO2 emissions per capita
PM2.5
Forest area (% of total land area)
Arable land per person
Renewable energy consumption (%
of total final energy consumption)
Expected years of schooling
Life expectancy index
Population using at least basic
drinking-water sources (%)
Population using at least basic
sanitation facilities (%)

Weights
6.09%
9.20%
9.31%
12.30%
7.55%
8.74%
14.49%
8.38%
7.14%
7.39%
4.95%
4.45%

Note: The weights of 12 indicators are following the work of Jin et al. (2020).
Figure A1. The NSDI of 52 Countries in the 5 Periods from 1991-2015
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Figure A2. The Variation Trend of NSDI of 52 Countries from 2010-2016
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